Following the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma model and the Adaptation model discussed in Adaptation, create a world in which turtles randomly play PD with each other. Each turtle has a strategy of the form:
If my opponent's moves on our last N games were X1, X2, ..., XN, then my move on our next game should be Y.
Where:
Xi = true or false: did opponent cooperated in ith
game?
Y = true or false: I will cooperate in our next game!
Initially, all of the Xi's and Y's are random Booleans.
A turtle also has an age attribute that increments each time the turtle is updated. At the end of its life span, a reasonably fit turtle (i.e., a turtle whose strategies has had some success) finds reasonably fit mates and creates offspring. The strategy of an offspring is obtained from the parent's strategy through cross over and mutation. You might want to allow truly superior turtles to create more offspring than mediocre turtles. Of course slacker turtles don't create any offspring.
Do average scores rise from one generation to the next? How does the size of the population change? What sliders should be provided?