

Perfect forward secrecy (PFS)

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What is Perfect Forward Secrecy?^[1]

- Perfect forward secrecy (PFS) is a property of the key-agreement protocol that ensures that session key used to encrypt the data will not be compromised even if long term private key compromised in future.
- The idea is to not to use single key (e.g. private key) to generate all the session keys. Also, same material or method should not use to generate session key.


Why PFS is required?[\[2\]](#)

- Lets say Alice and Bob want to safely communicate over network using Symmetric-key cryptography.
- Suppose Alice generates Session key using her private key and encrypt data using session key. She sent the resulting cipher to Bob. Trudy wants to acquire this information. She can record all the messages communicate over network. She does not know Alice's private key so she cannot know how session key is derived and how data is encrypted.
- Later, Trudy breaks Alice computer and obtain her private key K . Trudy can now decrypt Session key and all the previously recorded messages.
- Above situation is the motivational factor for the Perfect forward secrecy.
- The main problem is, private key is used for two purposes: authentication and encryption. Authentication only matters while the communication is established, but encryption is expected to last for years

How PFS works?^[3]

- PFS periodically creates a new session key value based on values supplied by both parties in the exchange. Because both parties contribute a random value known only to them, each new key generated is dissimilar to previously created keys.
- Even if a third party managed to intercept a private key, that party can only use the intercepted key for a short time.
- The newly created key is not used same method or material as used in the previously intercepted key, the third party must begin a new brute force calculation to guess the new key value
- Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange and Elliptic curve Diffie–Hellman are two most elegant approach for PFS.

How Diffie-Hellman Works? [4]



- In this protocol, g and p are public. Alice chooses a secret exponent a and Bob a secret exponent b .
- Then Alice sends $g^a \bmod p$ to Bob and Bob sends $g^b \bmod p$ to Alice. Alice and Bob can then each compute the shared secret $g^{ab} \bmod p$.
- In order to prevent the MiM attack, Alice and Bob can use their shared symmetric key K_{AB} to encrypt the Diffie-Hellman exchange
- Then to attain PFS, all that is required is that, once Alice has computed the shared session key $K_s = g^{ab} \bmod p$, she must forget her secret exponent a and, similarly Bob must forget his secret exponent b .

How to set up PFS?^[5]

- Session key is key factor to determine whether connection has perfect forward secrecy is determined by how the session key is derived. And how the session key is derived is determined by the cipher suite in use.
- In the beginning SSL handshake, the client sends a list of supported cipher suites .
- The server then picks one of the cipher suites, based on a ranking and inform client which cipher suite will be used from next onwards communication.
- Last step determines whether or not the further connection will have perfect forward secrecy
- Cipher suites that use ephemeral Diffie-Hellman (DHE) or the elliptic-curve variant (ECDHE) will have perfect forward secrecy

How to set up PFS on Apache Server?[\[6\]](#)

- Web server probably has a cipher suite configuration in its SSL configuration. There are two relevant options: first, the cipher suites that you want your server to use, and second, how the server picks the cipher suite. The order of cipher suite also matters
- For the Apache server Perfect Forward Secrecy requires Apache 2.3.3 or higher
- Here is one example configuration for mod_ssl that will work to enable Perfect Forward Secrecy:

```
SSLProtocol +TLSv1 +TLSv1.1 +TLSv1.2
SSLHonorCipherOrder On
SSLCipherSuite ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:AES128-SHA:RC4-SHA
```

Challenges for PFS^[7]

- DHE is significantly slower due to additional calculations.
- Web site operators tend to disable DHE suites in order to achieve better performance.
- Not all browsers support all the necessary suites.
- ECDHE too is slower, but not as much as DHE but ECDHE algorithms are relatively new and not as widely supported.

How to verify PFS?

There are many ways to verify PFS, I have listed below 3 ways to do that. I have used www.yioop.com as my test site.

1. OPENSLL Utility
2. SSL Scan Utility
3. <https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html>

OPENSSL Utility

[illegible]

SSL Scan Utility

```
C:\Users\Akash\Desktop\SSLScan-1.8.2-win-r7>SSLScan --no-failed www.yioop.com
```

The logo for SSLScan is a stylized representation of the word 'SSLSCAN' in a monospaced font. The letters are composed of horizontal and vertical lines, giving it a digital or circuit-like appearance. The 'S' and 'C' are particularly prominent with their curved shapes.

```
Version 1.8.2-win
http://www.titania.co.uk
Copyright Ian Ventura-Whiting 2009
Compiled against OpenSSL 0.9.8m 25 Feb 2010
```

```
Testing SSL server www.yioop.com on port 443
```

Supported Server Cipher(s):

Accepted	SSLv3	256 bits	DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA
Accepted	SSLv3	256 bits	AES256-SHA
Accepted	SSLv3	128 bits	DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA
Accepted	SSLv3	128 bits	AES128-SHA
Accepted	SSLv3	168 bits	EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA
Accepted	SSLv3	168 bits	DES-CBC3-SHA
Accepted	SSLv3	128 bits	RC4-SHA
Accepted	SSLv3	128 bits	RC4-MD5
Accepted	TLSv1	256 bits	DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA
Accepted	TLSv1	256 bits	AES256-SHA
Accepted	TLSv1	128 bits	DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA
Accepted	TLSv1	128 bits	AES128-SHA
Accepted	TLSv1	168 bits	EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA
Accepted	TLSv1	168 bits	DES-CBC3-SHA
Accepted	TLSv1	128 bits	RC4-SHA
Accepted	TLSv1	128 bits	RC4-MD5

Preferred Server Cipher(s):

SSLv3	256 bits	DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA
TLSv1	256 bits	DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA

SSL Lab Test



You are here: [Home](#) > [Projects](#) > [SSL Server Test](#) > yioop.com

SSL Report: yioop.com (173.13.143.74)

Assessed on: Tue Oct 15 19:43:19 UTC 2013 | [Clear cache](#)



Cipher Suites (sorted by strength; the server has no preference)

TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 (0x4)	128
TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA (0x5)	128
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0x2f)	128
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0x33) DH 1024 bits (p: 128, g: 1, Ys: 128) FS	128
TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA (0x96)	128
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA (0x9a) DH 1024 bits (p: 128, g: 1, Ys: 128) FS	128
TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA (0xa)	168
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA (0x16) DH 1024 bits (p: 128, g: 1, Ys: 128) FS	168
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0x35)	256
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0x39) DH 1024 bits (p: 128, g: 1, Ys: 128) FS	256

Forward Secrecy

With some browsers ([more info](#))

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References

- 1.http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perfect_forward_secrecy
- 2.Section 9.3.4 of Information Security Principles and practice by Dr. Mark Stamp ,Published by JohnWiley & Sons, Inc
- 3.<http://tinyurl.com/lamysw6>
- 4.Section 9.3.4 of Information Security Principles and practice by Dr, Mark Stamp
- 5.<http://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/8933/how-can-i-use-ssl-tls-with-perfect-forward-secrecy>
- 6.<https://scottlinux.com/2013/06/26/how-to-enable-perfect-forward-secrecy-in-apache-on-linux/>
- 7.<https://community.qualys.com/blogs/securitylabs/2013/06/25/ssl-labs-deploying-forward-secrecy>